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NOTES
Class Actions—Tolling of Statutes of Limitations—Adequate
Representation —Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank' —On November
13, 1972, the plaintiff Haas instituted a class action in federal district
court alleging that three banks—Pittsburgh National, Mellon, and
Equibank—had exacted an unlawfully high finance charge on revolv-
ing credit accounts because they (1) applied a nominal rate of interest
above that authorized by Pennsylvania law, (2) used the previous bal-
ance method of computing interest, and (3) compounded the
interest. 2 The purported class included all credit cardholders of the
three banks who had paid interests within the two-year limitations
period set by the National Bank Act. 4 Haas, who was the only named
representative of the class, possessed revolving credit accounts with
Pittsburgh National Bank and Mellon, but not with the defendant
Equibank. 5
On January 21, 1974, the district court, reversing an earlier de-
cision for certification of the class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,° concluded that Haas could not represent
Equibank cardholders because she did not herself have a claim against
that defendant.' Mitchell was therefore added to represent the class
on this claim 9 and certification was again granted: 9 Summary judg-
ment was then ordered for the defendants on each of the credit card
issues, the court holding that the 1 1/a percent per month service
charge, the previous balance method of computing interest, and the
compounding, were all authorized by Pennsylvania law." In addition
it held that the two-year statute of limitations was not tolled against
Equibank until the January 21, 1974 order adding Mitchell." Since
Equibank had discontinued use of the previous balance method prior
to January 21, 1972, the court found that the claim based on this
method was time-barred."
The plaintiffs initially appealed all claims to the Third Circuit.
' 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
2 1d. at 1085-86. The action was brought in federal court under the National
Bank Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 38 el seq. (1970), which makes state banking laws applicable to
the national hanks. Id. § 85.
3 526 F.2d at 1086.
4
 12 U.S.C. 86 (1970); see 526 F.2d at 1096 n.16.
z Id. at 1086. The revolving charge accounts involved were Master Charge and
BankAmericard. Id. at 1085.
8 Id. at 1095. The district court initially certified the class in Hass v. Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 604 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
7
 526 F.2d at 1095. The court based its reversal on O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974) and LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973),
which were not decided until after the original certification order. 526 F.2d at 1095.
8 526 F.2d at 1095.
9 See Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 803 (W.D. Pa., 1974).
'° Id. at 806-09.
"See id. at 807-08. The complaint was actually amended to add Mitchell on Feb-
ruary 19, 1974, 526 F.2d at 1095, but the court appears to have related the amendment
back to the date of its order.
12
 Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 807-08 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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While the appeal was pending, however, the Third Circuit decided in
Acker v. Provident National Bank' 3 that the 1 vi percent interest rate
charged by banks on revolving credit accounts is lawful, at least on
consumer transactions." In light of this ruling, the plaintiffs dropped
their interest rate claim as to consumer transactions, but continued to
assert that the 11/4 percent rate was unauthorized on commercial
dealings." No indication was given on the record, however, that
either Haas or Mitchell had participated in any commercial
transactions.'° Therefore, the court in Haas was presented with the
question of whether the named plaintiffs, without such participation,
could be proper representatives on this claim."
The Court of
r s
 for the Third Circuit HELD: (1) a party is
not as a matter of law an improper class representative on a claim for
which he has no - standing if he possesses closely related claims in the
same suit;" (2) compounding and the previous balance method for
computing interest are unauthorized by Pennsylvania law in revolving
credit card accounts;" and (3) the statute of limitations is tolled for a
class at the original filing of a suit even though the class action is sub-
sequently held not maintainable because of improper representation."
The court reasoned that the close relationship between the named
plaintiffs' interests in the previous balance method and compounding
claims and the interests of the class members who had engaged in
commercial transactions allowed a conclusion that the latter would be
adequately protected;" therefore, the approval of representative
status for the named plaintiffs would , not be an abuse of the district
court's discretion. 22
 On the tolling question, the court stated that Rule
23's23 policy of economy and efficiency of litigation—as expressed by
the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co.
v. Utah 24 —required the tolling of the statute of limitations against
13
 512 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1975).
' 4 1d. at 739.
12
 526 F.2d at 1087.
' 5 1d. Since the issue of Haas' or Mitchell's' involvement in commercial transac-
tions was not raised at trial, the court of appeals had to make its own conclusions on the
basis of the record. See id. at 087-88. It concluded that as a matter of law the plaintiffs'
transactions with Mellon Bank were not commercial. Id. at 1088. The court found no
evidence in the record of the nature of plaintiffs' transactions with Pittsburgh National
Bank or Equibank and therefore left that issue to the trial court of remand. Id. at 1087.
" See id. at 1088.
' 5 1d. at 1089. The issue was therefore remanded to the trial court for decision.
Id.
'° Id: at 1093, 1095. The court did not decide the commercial interest rate issue
since it had determined that its existence on appeal depended on a ruling by the trial
court on the propriety of the plaintiffs' representation. Id. at 1089-90.
"Id. at 1097-98.
21 1d. at 1088-89.
"Id. at 1089.
23 FED. R. Civ, P. 23.
24 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
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Equibank at the time of the original filing by Haas. 25
The Haas case is significant because it is the first court of ap-
peals analysis of the tolling principles of American Pipe, and because of
its substantial liberalization of the representation requirements of Rule
23. This note will analyze both of these class action issues. First, the
decision on the tolling of the statute of limitations will be analyzed to
determine if the decision in Haas is consistent with the policies ex-
pressed in American Pipe. Next, inquiry will be made as to whether the
question of the adequacy of representation on the commercial transac-
tion issue was properly left to the discretion of the trial court, or
whether it should have been decided as a matter of law by the court
of appeals. It will ultimately be submitted that the Haas court was cor-
rect in its broad interpretation of American Pipe but incorrect, in light
of the policies of Federal Rule 23, in its decision not to declare the
representation inadequate.
I. TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The primary issue raised in Haas concerned the application and
functioning of the statute of limitations in Federal Rule 23 class ac-
tions. The tolling of a statute of limitations is a well-settled procedure
in the federal courts." The tolling operation is considered an integral
part of the functioning of a statute of limitations 27 and is used only
when a strong policy requires it. 28 In class action situations there is a
strong policy in favor of the promotion of litigative efficiency. 29
Therefore, the statute of limitations had been held to toll at the com-
mencement of a "spurious" class suit filed under the pre-1966 Rule 23
for intervenors who would nevertheless not have been bound by an
adverse decision. 3° For similar reasons, it is now settled that under the
present Rule 23 the statute is tolled for all absent class members at the
filing of the suit, provided the class status is ultimately maintained. 31
The specific problem which faced the court in Hams was whether
a statute of limitations is tolled at the filing of an action for purported
25 526 F.2d at 1096-98.
26 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975);
Burnett v. New York Cent.. R.RI, 380 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1965).
27 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463 (1975).
" See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466-67 & n.13
(1975); International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 708
(1966). For example, courts have held that limitations periods have been tolled where a
defendant's fraud prevented a plaintiff from discovering his injury, Holmberg v.
Artnbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), or where a timely-filed claim was dismissed for
lack of venue after the statutory period had run. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380
U.S. 424, 434-35 (1965).
" See text at notes 54-57 infra.
30 Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1965).
31 A4merican Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550-52; Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d
239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S, 1011 (1975); Minnesota v. United States Steel
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 573 (D. Minn. 1968). .
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class members whose class status is subsequently denied because of
improper representation. 32 This decision turned on a determination
of the breadth of I the holding of the recently-decided United States
Supreme Court case of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah. 33
American Pipe presented the Supreme Court with the question of toll-
ing the statute of limitations for absent class members where the sub-
sequent denial of class status was due to a failure of numerosity. 34
The plaintiff state of Utah filed a complaint in federal district
court alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act by the de-
fendant pipe dealers.35
 The suit purported to be a class action, with
the named plaintiff representing all Utah state departments that had
dealt with the defendants, as well as any similarly situated Western
states that had not already commenced like actions." On motion by
the defendant under Rule 23 (c)(1), the district court held that the ac-
tion could not continue as a class suit because the plaintiff class did
not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 (a)(1). 37 The Utah
state departments then moved to intervene as named plaintiffs in the
suit either as of right under Rule 24 (a)(2), 36 or by permission under
Rule 24 (b)(2). 39 The court denied intervention as of right," and held
that permissive intervention by the parties was now time-barred since
the limitations period had run out.'" On appeal, the excluded mem-
bers argued that the statute. of limitations was tolled for them at the
commencement of the original suit. 42 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed with this contention and reversed the lower
court. 43
" 526 F.2d at 1095. In addition fo the tolling argument, the appellants in Haas
also contended that the addition of MitChell as a named plaintiff should relate back to
the initial filing•of the complaint under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Id. at 1096. Brief of Ap-
pellant at 39-41, Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court did not deal with this contention, but a similar argument has been rejected by the
Tenth Circuit. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex., 511 F.2d 1073,
1079 (10th Cir. 1975). The issue was also raised and rejected by the district court in
American Pipe. Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 108-09 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
" 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
"See 414 U.S. at 552.
"Id. at 541.
" Id.
37 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D. Cal. 1969). For
text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(1), see note 75 infra.
" Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 101-02 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
" 50 F.R.D. at 102. FED. R. Ctv. P. 24(b)(2).
40 50 F.R.D. at 102.
4 ' Id. at 108. The statute of limitations had eleven days to run on May 13, 1969,
when Utah filed its class suit, 414 U.S. at 541. It was not until November, 1969, that the
plaintiffs class status was terminated. Id. at 542.
"2 See Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 583-84 (9th Cir.
1973).
45 1d. at 584.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and affirmed the ap-
peals court's decision," stating that the statute of limitations was tolled
at the filing for all purported class members where the class suit was
rejected because of a failure of numerosity:"
We hold that in this posture, at least where class action
status has been denied solely because of failure to demon-
strate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable," the commencement of the orig-
inal class suit tolls the running of the statute for all pur-
ported members of the class who make timely motions to
intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate
for class action status. 47
As stated, therefore, the Court's holding goes no further than the
facts of the case, limiting the tolling of the statute to situations where
the plaintiffs fail to meet the numerosity requirement and subse-
quently file for intervention. Indeed, the Supreme Court quoted the
court of appeals opinion which specifically distinguished such fact
situations as that in Haas where class status denial was based on a lack
of proper representation." Nevertheless, the broad policy considera-
tions which the Court used as the rationale for its decision seem
equally applicable to circumstances beyond the limited facts of the
American Pipe case.
The Court stated that the question of tolling in class actions
should be resolved by a consideration of the policies underlying both
Rule 23 and the statute of limitations." This consideration involves
three factors. 5° First, the tolling must serve to further the "economy
and efficiency of litigation"—a principal purpose of Rule 23. 5 ' Sec-
ond, essential fairness must be ensured to the defendants by proper
notification within the limitations period. 52 Finally, the absent plaintiffs
" American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
45 414 U.S. at 561.
46 Id. at 552-53.
" Id.
" Id. at 553. The court of appeals emphasized that insufficient numerosity was
the defect causing class termination, stating that "[m]aintenance of the class action was
denied not for failure of the complaint to state a claim on behalf of the members of the
class ... [and] not for lack of standing of the representative, or for reasons of had faith
or frivolity." Utah v. American Pipe & Contr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973)
(footnote omitted).
" 414 U.S. at 553-56.
Sold.
51 Id. at 553.
"Id. at 554-55. The Court here cited the opinion in Burnett v. New York Cent
R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965), and stated that the policies of the statute of limitations
were those of -ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a plaintiff who
has 'slept on his rights." 414 U.S. at 554. The requirement of notice was further em-
phasized in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), where the
Court stated that "American Pipe ... depended heavily on the fact that [the filing] in-
volved exactly the same cause of action subsequently asserted." Id. at 467.
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cannot be allowed to "sleep on their rights" to the detriment of the
defendants."
The first prerequisite, furtherance of litigative economy and ef-
ficiency, is operative where the class as initially set forth has a reason-
able chance for certification. 54 Tolling of a statute of limitations serves
the goal of litigative efficency by preventing superfluous protective
motions for intervention by absent class members. 55 Such motions are
superfluous when they are made in class suits that are subsequently
certified, since in these suits the statute is tolled' for the absent mem-
bers at the filing. 58 If tolling is not to be provided, however, in class
suits that were subsequently denied certification but that were submit-
ted on nonfrivolous grounds, absent members in all class actions will
justifiably feel the need to intervene prior to the running of the limi-
tations period in order to protect themselves against a possible denial
of class status. Therefore, members of a reasonably defined class
should be protected by tolling. The same is not true, however, where
the class action was frivolous and never had a significant chance of
being certified. Intervention is superfluous only insofar as it occurs in
class suits that are subsequently held maintainable. Since certification
will not result where the class is unreasonably defined, no litigative ef-
ficiency will be lost if intervention is encouraged by not tolling the
statute of limitations.
This suggested test places 'the burden on the district court to de-
termine when a class was reasonably defined, even though certifica-
tion was ultimately denied. One factor in this determination is the
procedural context within which the class status was terminated. In
Haas, the trial court initially certified the case as a class action and
only later reversed itself and terminated the class status. 57 Similarly,
class status could be granted at the trial level only to be overturned on
appeal. In these situations the court's difficulty in determining the
maintainability of the , class aspect of the suit should be a sufficient in-
dication that the class standing had a possibility of success. Therefore,
it is submitted that in such cases, where an initial certification is fol-
lowed by a termination of class status, the reasonableness of the class
aspect of the claim should be found per se; the policy of litigative effi-
ciency should be held to have been served. In all other cases, the dis-
trict court judge, acting in his discretion, will have to determine if the
55
 414 U.S. lit 554.
54 Cf. 419 U.S. at 553-54; Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 579 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
35
 414 U.S. at 553.
56 See id. at 553-54,
67
 526 F.2d at 1095. Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D 571 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
similarly presented a case where an initial certification of the class was reversed. In
Goldstein, the court, relying on American Pipe, id. at 578-79, held that the statute was
tolled at filing even though class status was denied because of a failure to meet the pre-
dominance requirements of FED. R. Cm/. P. 23(b)(3). Id. at 580.
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class was reasonably defined based on a thorough consideration of all
factors.
The second condition for the tolling of the statute of limitations
is that the tolling not interfere with the purposes of the statute." An
important consideration here is the specific requirement of Rule 23
which resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs' class status. 59 The
policy of the statute of limitations requires that the defendant be
given notice of the action being brought against him." Such notice is
clearly provided where the only failure of the class was to meet the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(I), as in American Pipe. 6 '
Likewise, it appears that where class status is denied solely because of
a failure to meet the section (a)(3) and (a)(4) representation require-
ments, as in Haas,62 tolling should be applied. In such cases the iden-
tity of the real plaintiffs, the class members, is known to the defen-
dant upon the commencement of the suit, as is the nature of the sub-
stantive claims. The defendant banks in Haas were well aware of the
nature of the claims that were being made against them, and of the
identity of the plaintiff cardholders, as soon as the suit was filed.
Whether Haas or Mitchell or some other individual represented the
class was irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant received
fair notice of the pending action. Therefore, the notice being suffi-
cient to satisfy the policy of the limitations period, the statute should
be tolled.
An expansion of this tolling policy to cases where the class status
was terminated for failure to meet the (a)(2) requirement of common-
ality, or the (b)(3) requirement that common questions predominate
or that the class action be superior to other procedures, presents
harder questions and must be dealt with by examining the individual
complaints on a case-by-case basis. The same considerations of notice
apply, but in these situations there exists a real possibility that a com-
plaint may be so unclear as to either the substantive claim or the iden-
tity of injured class members that the defendant would not be pro-
vided with a picture of the essential nature of the action being
brought against him. One post American Pipe court did find the statute
tolled after a termination for lack of predominance under (b)(3), but
in so doing seemed heavily influenced by the closeness of the certifi-
cation question in the case." Cases of this type appear to be properly
5° See 414 U.S. at 554; 526 F.2d at 1097 n.19. American Pipe looks to the general
policies of the statutes of limitations. Where a particular statute of limitations has a
purpose that is unique, however, this purpose should also be analyzed. See Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1965).
5° See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461
(E.D. Pa. 1968). The Philadelphia Electric court stated that tolling would not be proper
where class status was denied because of unsatisfactory representation. but might be
supported if the denial were based on reasons of "judicial housekeeping." Id.
"414 U.S. at 554.
"' Id. at 554-55.
62
 See text at note 7 supra.
62 Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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a matter for the trial court's discretion.
Also relevant to the consideration of fair notice is the limitation
in the holding of American Pipe which would appear to confine tolling
to those absent members who chose to intervene rather than to bring
a separate suit or, as in Haas, to proceed in the original suit as part of
the amended class." The propriety of such a rule seems to be depen-
dent upon the question of proper notice to the defendant. Unless ac-
tion other than intervention would present issues that were not raised
by the original class filing, or otherwise seriously inconvenience or
prejudice the defendant, there appears no reason why the statute
should not toll for members using such different procedures."
The third policy consideration underlying Rule 23 and the stat-
ute of limitations is that a plaintiff should not be allowed to "sleep on
his rights."" It appears that the nature of class actions precludes this
factor from being an important consideration in most class situations.
The American Pipe Court emphasized the essential character of the
class suit as a representative action the judgment in which is generally
res judicata as to absent class members." Because of this res judicata
effect, absent class members should be considered as much a part of
the suit as are the named parties," and accordingly should not be re-
garded as "sleeping on their rights" while the action is pending. It is
especially unfair to regard plaintiffs as having slept on their rights
where a reasonable class is subsequently denied class status, absent any
bad faith.
One further factor should be considered by the courts where a
lack of clarity in the initial filing is sufficient to deprive the defendant
of notice and therefore to preclude the imposition of the tolling
doctrine." In such situations, the courts might balance the interests of
the parties by holding that the statute would be tolled only for those
absent members who relied on the pending class suit. This approach
was taken by many of the courts that decided the issue prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe." The Court in American
Pipe ruled out reliance as a distinguishing factor where the plaintiff's
" 414 U.S. at 553.
as
	
Haas the appellees, quoting Wheeler, Predismissal Notice and Statutes of Limita-
tions in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL L.
Rev, 771, 782-83 (1975), contended that the membership requirement stated in the
holding of American Pipe precluded tolling where representation failed, since no class
ever existed. See Supplemental Brief for Appellee Equibank N.A. at 2-4, Haas v.
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). It is difficult to understand, how-
ever, why this rationale, once accepted, would not operate to preclude tolling in all class
action situations, including that decided to the contrary in American Pipe.
"414 U.S. at 554.
57 1d. at 551-52.
65 1d.
ga See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
"See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 394 n.13 (S.D. Fla.
1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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class status was successfully certified." It reasoned that since the class
action is a truly representative suit, the benefits of the filing should
accrue to all members, whether with or without knowledge of the
action." The same rationale, however, should not work in the con-
trary situation to frustrate the interests of the relying members where
there exists no opportunity to protect the entire class.
Significantly, this solution would satisfy the policy of Rule 23 in
preventing needless motions for intervention since anyone in a posi-
tion to make such a motion could refuse to do so, claim reliance, and
be protected if class status were subsequently denied.
In sum, it appears that the Haas court's broad interpretation of
American Pipe was correct. The rationale underlying the decision in
American Pipe dictates that the statute be tolled for absent members
where class status fails because of representation defects, as well as
commonality or manageability problems, provided the proposed class
had a reasonable chance of certification. Where the satisfaction of the
policies for tolling are less clear, a court may consider reliance by the
intervenor in making its decision. 73
II. ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
The Third Circuit's decision in Haas concerning the propriety of
Haas' representation on the commercial transaction issue was based
upon its interpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 74 Subsection (a) of Rule 23 sets out the prerequisites for
the maintenance of any class action." Subsection (b) describes the
" 414 U,S. at 551-52.
" Id.
13 It has been assumed in the previous discussion that the absent members assert-
ing the tolling of the statute did so shortly after their class status was terminated. The
same tolling question may be raised, however, where the absentees chose to appeal the
unfavorable class determination rather than to intervene. There have been no cases
since American Pipe directly deciding this matter, but in the recent case of firnenez v.
Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit stated by way of dicta that
it thought that the tolling would continue if the plaintiffs appealed the ruling. Id. at
696. An analogous situation arose in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424
(1965), where the Supreme Court, holding that the filing of a FELA suit in a state court
tolled the statute of limitations even though the action was subsequently dismissed for
lack of venue, stated that the statute would remain tolled until a final judgment on ap-
peal. Id. at 434-35. This approach seems to be correct, since a determination that tolling
is warranted where the member intervenes implies that the defendant has received suf-
ficient notice of the suit to satisfy the policies of the statute of limitations. A further
delay in the final decision of the case would not significantly prejudice the defendants.
74 526 F.2d at 1088-89.
" FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable. (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative par-
ties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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three particular types of class suits that may be brought and provides
conditions necessary for each. 7° Finally, subsections (c), (d), and (e) es-
tablish the procedures by which a class suit will be processed in the
courts."
The Haas court interpreted subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4), the rep-
resentation requirements of Rule 23, as not precluding, as a matter of
law, Haas' representation on the commercial transaction claim." The
court decided that the two claims in which Haas had an interest—the
previous balance method claim and the compounding claim—were so
closely related to the commercial transaction issue that the representa-
tion was justified." The court based this finding on three factors: (I)
all three claims arose under the same statutory provisions of the Na-
tional Bank Act;_(2) the underlying cardholder agreements were the
same in each case; and (3) the damages to be recovered for each viola-
tion would be largely identical." It appears, however, that the rela-
tionship which existed between the commercial rate claims and the
other two issues was insignificant for the purpose of determining rep-
resentation, and that Haas should have therefore been found an im-
proper representative for the commercial class as a matter of law.
The nature of the relationship that must exist between the in-
terests of the representative and the interests of the class can be dis-
cerned only by examining the language of the Rule, the policies upon
which the rule is based, and the mandates of due process which apply
to class actions. Turning first to an examination of the language of
Rule 23, subsection (a)(l) requires that the representative be a
member of the class." In conjunction with subsection (a)(2), this re-
quirement ensures that the representative possesses common ques-
tions of law or fact with the class since (a)(2) mandates such in all class
76 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Subsection 23(6) provides that a class action is maintain-
able where the prerequisites of 23(a) are met and either (1) separate actions would
create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or be dispositive of the rights of non-party
class members, (2) the party opposing the class has acted in a way applicable to the
whole class and injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, or (3) questions of law or
fact common to the class predominate and a class action is superior to all other methods
of adjudication. Id. • •
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (d), (e). Subsection 23(c) provides that the court shall de-
termine the maintainability of the class action as soon as possible after its commence-
ment, that notice shall be directed to all class members in a suit under subdivision
(b)(3), that the judgment will bind all members who did not withdraw from the class,
and that subclasses may be formed. Subsection (d) describes the circumstances under
which a court may issue orders in a class suit, and what these orders may accomplish.
Subsection (e) specifies the procedures for dismissing or settling class suits. Id.
526 F.2d at 1088-89. The representation question was therefore remanded to
the district court for a decision by the trial judge acting within his discretion. Id. at
1089.
"Id.
"D Id. Section 86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1970), specifies that
damages would be an amount equal to twice the full interest charge paid by the claim-
ant.
" Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962). For text see note 75 supra.
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actions." Specific prerequisites for representation are defined in sub-
sections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of the rule. Subsection 23(a)(4) requires that
"the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class."" This provision had been the only requirement
for representation prior to the 1966 amendments to the rule." In the
1966 revision subsection 23(a)(3) was added, requiring that "[tihe
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class . "85
The specific language of subdivision 23(a) does, therefore, re-
quire some relationship of interest between the named and unnamed
plaintiffs. In order that subsection (a)(3) be more than a repetition of
the (a)(2) prerequisite," "typical claims or defenses" must be con-
strued to require a closer similarity of interests between the represen-
tative and the class than "common questions of law or fact" that (a)(2)
mandates among members."' The precise extent to which this similar-
ity must be achieved, however, is left uncertain by the Rule. Similarly,
the "adequate protection" mandate of subsection (a)(4), while gener-
ally construed to require at least a competent, experienced counsel,"
does not clearly delineate the interest relationship that must exist for
proper representation." The policy of the rule must be examined,
therefore, to clarify the nature of this relationship.
Two of the principle policies supporting the Rule normally miti-
gate in favor of the certification of class suits. First, the Rule is in-
tended to promote the "economy and efficiency of litigation" by the
consolidation of claims involving the same causes of action." The ju-
dicial system has a serious stake both in the production of consistent
judgments in cases involving the same facts and in the elimination of
duplicitous actions."' Where this policy is involved the courts should
"See Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterp., 52 F.R.D. 335, 343 n.14 (D.
Minn. 1971). For text see note 75 supra.
81 FED. R. Civ.P. 23(a)(4). For text see note 75 supra.
" 4 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 94-95 (1966).
" Id, at 96. For text see note 75 supra.
"° It is a general canon of statutory construction that a statute should not be
given an interpretation that makes it redundant. Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338,
344 (1945).
a' Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterp. 52 F.R.D. 335, 343 n.14 (D. Minn.
1971). But see 5B J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, Moom's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.06-2, at 23-325
(2d ed. 1975), to the effect that subsection 23(a)(3) does duplicate other provisions of
Rule 23 and is therefore unnecessary.
"See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307,
319 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
89 For text see note 75 supra.
"American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553.
"See id.; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). This opinion was one of several which were issued
in the Eisen case. Initially, the class action was held not maintainable at 41 F.R.D. 197
(S.D.N.Y, 1966). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the denial was
appealable at 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966) and certiorari was denied. 386 U.S.
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construe the prerequisites to the Rule liberally. 92
Similarly, Rule 23 is designed to allow the vindication of claims
too small to warrant the expenses involved in an individual suit." Par-
ties with large claims have no need to resort to class actions since their
expected damages will justify the costs of individual litigation. In
many circumstances, however, the expense of a suit would outweigh
the potential reward to the claimant. In such cases, where other par-
ties are similarly situated, a class action may be brought to satisfy the
claims. The Rule should also not be strictly construed to discourage
this practical purpose of class litigation. 94
The requirement of due process, however, mitigates against, and
in some cases totally eclipses, these two policy considerations." In the
United States Supreme Court case of Hansberry v. Lee," the Court re-
jected the binding effect of a class suit on absent members because the
1035 (1967). The Second Circuit then reversed and remanded in the opinion cited
here. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir 1968). On remand the district court determined that further
information should be elicited, 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), held that the action was
maintainable, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and required the defendants to bear 90
percent of the cost of notice, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Court of Appeals re-
versed the certification of the class action, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), and the United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that notice must be given and
paid for by defendants. 417 U.S. 905 (1974).
"Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1979); see Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731,
733 (2d Cir. 1965).
93
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733
(2d Cir. 1965); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). It should be noted
that the National Bank Act has been held to be an act regulating commerce, Cupo v.
Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 438 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1971), and therefore
jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and no $10,000 minimum amount is required.
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733
(2d Cir. 1965); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
95
 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); .C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1765, at 620 (1972). Subsection (c)(3)
of Rule 23 provides that all members of a class in an action brought under 23(b)(I) or
23(b)(2) of the rule, as well as all members of a class under 23(b)(3) to whom notice was
directed and who did not request exclusion, will be bound by a judgment in the action.
FED. R.Ctv. P. 23(c)(3).
96 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In Hansberty, the respondent brought suit to enforce an
agreement restricting, on a racial basis, the sale of certain lands. Id. at 37. The petition-
ers claimed that the convenant was invalid in spite of an adjudication to the contrary in
a class suit. Id. at 38. They contended that the prior determination should have no res
judicata effect because, although they were included within the class described in the
earlier suit, the representation for that class was inadequate and therefore an enforce-
ment of the judgment on the absent class members would deprive them of their Four-
teenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 38. The Supreme Court of Illinois held
for the plaintiffs, enforcing the prior judgment, Lee v. Hansberry, 372 III. 369, 24
N.E.2d 37 (1939), and the United States Supreme Court reversed. 311 U.S. at 46.
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representation was inadequate." The Court noted that representation
would be proper only where "[t]he interests of those not joined are of
the same class as the interests of those who are ...." 98 To bind absent
members to a judgment where this standard is not met would be a
violation of the due process rights of these members."
In federal class actions, this due process imperative has become
extremely important with the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. Prior to
the changes, absent members in a "spurious" class suit"° were con-
sidered bound by a judgment only if they had intervened in the
suit."' The new rule, however, specified that members to whom
notice was directed would be bound unless they affirmatively removed
themselves from the action under the "opt-out" scheme. 102 In such
circumstances, the court itself must provide for the protection of the
interests of the absentees by assuring proper representation and a fair
hearing of the members' claims.'° 2 To do otherwise would be an
abuse of the class action procedure which exists in large part for the
convenience of the judicial system and not the class members.'"
In applying the representation requirements of Rule 23 and the
due process clause, the courts have stated the representation test in a
variety of ways.'° 5 It is accepted that the interests of the representa-
tives and those of the class members must not be in conflict.'" At
least one court has indicated that the interests of the two groups must
be identical,'" but this standard is generally regarded as too strict." 8
" Id. at 42-44.
98 1d, at 41.
9g See id. at 41-42.
' 0° The pre-1966 Rule provided three types of class suits based upon the jural re-
lationship of the class members. 3B J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 87, 1 23.02-1, at
23-123. The "spurious" suit approximated the type action now available under subsec-
tion (b)(3). Id. at 23-124.
"' Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators, 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950); Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944).
' DI FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
gg See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
"'See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562
(2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
'" See 7 C. WRIGHT & A.MILLER. supra note 95, HI 1764-69.
1 " Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 826 (1970); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 1768, at 638.
1 " See Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1128, 1234-35 (N.D. III. 1971). Much of the
confusion with the tests in this area has resulted from differing definitions of the term
"coextensive." Insley v. Joyce, supra at 1234, used the term as a synonym for identical.
Many other courts, however, have required coextensive interests between the represen-
tatives and class members, but have defined this requirement as merely an absence of
conflict between the two groups, In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366,
397 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), or as typicality. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563
(2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); 3B. J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
supra note 87, 1 23.07[21, at 23-371.
108 See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 1769 at 612-13.
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Most courts have specified that the standard requires that there be "a
common basic element of fact or law" between the representative and
the members,'" or that the claims for relief be based on the same
legal or remedial theory."° It is submitted that the common legal
theory test and the requirements of due process mandate that the
class members must have in common with at least one representative
the basic legal or factual issue essential to their claim. If such is not
the case, there exists no assurance, other than the vigor and compe-
tence of the counsel, that the rights of the absentees will be ade-
quately protected. The proper presentation of an issue critical to a
class member's claim is more certain where that issue is also a signifi-
cant element in the claim of a representative. A representative with no
personal stake in an issue would be inclined to turn his efforts away
from the issue to a claim for which he may receive some reward.'"
Contrary to the holding of the court in Haas, it does not appear
that Haas or Mitchell possessed a sufficiently common nexus of facts
and legal issues with the members who were involved in commercial
transactions to satisfy the requirements of due process. The three fac-
tors relied on by the court in Haas to support its conclusion simply do
not withstand close scrutiny. The main consideration relied on by the
Haas court for its conclusion that the named plaintiffs' claims were re-
lated with the commercial transaction issue was that all three claims
rested on the same statutory provision, section 85 of the National
Bank Act." 2
 This position, however, ignores the real issues upon
which the action rested. It is true that all of the violations alleged
were violations of section 85 of the National Bank Act; however, that
provision merely adopted the state law governing local banking in-
stitutions and made it applicable to national banks." 3 Therefore, the
disposition of the issues in the case depended not on a construction of
section 85 but rather on the interpretation of the individual Pennsyl-
vania statutes which the National Bank Act incorporated. Since each
of the three claims in the case involved entirely different issues under
Pennsylvania law," 4
 they cannot properly be characterized as "closely
related."
t°9
 In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975).
"° E.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 71 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973). See also 7 C.
WRIGHT Se A. MILLER, ROM note 95, § 1769, at 655.
111
 Koos v. First Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974).
"2
 526 F.2d at 1088.
"3
 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970).
"4
 On the commercial transaction claim the court had to interpret the Pennsyl-
vania Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, * 309 (1967), and the Sales Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1975), and decide which of the two statutes was in-
tended to regulate the credit card transactions of banks. 526 F.2d at 1086-87. The pre-
vious balance claim turned on whether the Sales Act would be interpreted to allow that
method of computation, id. at 1091-94, whereas the compounding issue depended on
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Similarly, the other two bases for the court's finding of similarity
between the issues, the identity of the cardholder agreements and of
the potential damages, provide little to satisfy the due process de-
mands created by class actions. The construction of the cardholder
agreement was in dispute only on the compounding claim and only as
to whether an authorization of compounding could be read from its
language." 5 The agreement was of no relevance to the question of
the proper interest rate in commercial transactions.' 16 Therefore, it
can hardly be said that Haas' possession of the agreement would af-
fect the adequacy of her representation. This is also the case with the
question of damages. The court asserted a similarity between the
commercial claim and the claims of Haas and Mitchell because the
measure of damages for all three was the same—twice the interest
charge Paid." 7 Again, however, the measure of damages was not in
dispute in the commercial transaction issue." 8
 Therefore, it cannot be
relied on as a basis for finding the propriety of Haas' representation.
Due process requirements aside, the Haas court's decision on
representation also . pales in the face of the two policy considerations,
enumerated above,'" underlying Rule 23. The rejection of Haas as a
representative would do little to hinder the "economy and efficiency"
of the litigation since it is likely that the response by the class would
merely be the addition of another named plaintiff. Nor would any
superfluous protective motions for intervention be encouraged since
the initial filing of the suit would have tolled the statute of limitations
for all class members. 12 ° Therefore, Rule 23's policy of litigative
economy would not be a factor and would not mitigate for the reten-
tion of Haas as the class representative. Similarly, the vindication of
small claims would not be discouraged by requiring an additional rep-
resentative since the major costs of the litigation would be present re-
gardless of the addition.
In sum, the action by the Haas court in refusing to dismiss Haas
as a representative on the claim for which she had no standing was
contrary to the requirements of Rule 23. Haas did not have interests
sufficiently similar to those of the absent class members who had par-
ticipated in commercial transactions to adequately protect their rights.
In light of its holding in a different portion of the opinion that the
commencement of a class suit tolls the statute of limitations for the
whether the defendants' cardholder agreements specified that interest would be com-
pounded. Id. at 1094-95.
"5 See 526 F.2d at 1094-95.
"I' See id. at 1088-89.
'" Id. at 1089. The damages were specified in 11 86 of the National Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. § 86 (1970).
"8 See id. at 1088-89. The measure of damages was not in dispute on any of the
claims raised. See id. at 1088-89, 1090-95.
"9 See text at notes 88-44 supra.
no See text at notes 26-73 supra.
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entire class, 12 ' the court should have ordered that a new representa-
tive be named. This disposition would have ensured that the commer-
cial claim would have proceeded with a representative who, since his
interests would be much closer to those of the members of the class,
would be more likely to assert their rights in an effective manner.'"
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Haas made significant
rulings on two class action issues. The court's broad interpretation of
American Pipe is the more significant aspect of the case. As the first
court of appeals analysis of that case, Haas should provide the im-
petus for further applications of the tolling doctrine in order to pro-
tect the interests of absent class members. It appears that the court's
liberal interpretation of the representation prerequisites of Rule 23
was incorrect in light of the due process mandates underlying class
suits. Since, however, the final decision on such representation ques-
tions always lies within the discretion of the trial court, the impact of
the Haas ruling on this issue may merely be to change the grounds
for a named plaintiffs dismissal.
JAMES F. KAVANAUGH, JR.
"' 526 F.2d at 1097-98.
122 La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973), which the
Haas court distinguished, 526 F.2d at 1088, appears to present facts that more strongly
warrant a finding of adequate representation than did those of Haas. In La Mar,
representation was denied as a matter of law because the named plaintiff, although pos-
sessing a claim based on the same interests as the members, did not have standing
against all the defendants. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., supra at 465. The
identity of the defendant would seem to be unimportant in assuring the vigor of a
representative's advocacy, however, so long as the claims of the members and the rep-
resentative depended on a similar disposition of the legal issue. The La Mar court did
find other bases for its decision to deny class status. Id. at 466-68.
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